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VOTING TRUST AGREEMENTS1
By JOHN H. SHIPPEY, of the Denver Bar

HE necessary elements of a valid voting trust agreement
are that it be set up under a legal mechanism, and that it
be for a valid purpose.2 The principal consideration in
the cases on such agreements is whether or not they violate
public policy per se.' Inasmuch as there is, in Colorado, a
statute (Session Laws 1931, Ch. 70, Sec. 28, p. 253)' providing for voting trusts limited to a period not to exceed ten
years, such agreements, if properly in accord with the statute,
will, as to their validity, depend upon the purpose for which
they were entered into,5 the purpose being considered in the
light of public policy. Under the modern rule, voting trusts
are not considered per se unlawful,' and the rigor of the older
cases 7 is much relaxed.
Agreements have been held valid which secured a certain
business policy for a specific term of years,8 gave control of
the management in consideration of loans to the corporation9
or were set up with a provision requiring subsequent purchasers of trust certificates to become members of the trust;" each
agreement running to the common benefit of all the stockholders and the corporation, and not merely to the advantage
'Defined-Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 119 N. E. 559.
'Bowditch v. Jackson, 76 N. H. 351, 82 At. 74, LRA 1917A, 1174.
'Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Ins. Co. of Amer., 111 Va. 1, 68 S. E. 412,
31 LRAN. S. 1186 and note 1199.
'(a) May be established by one or more stockholders.
(b) One or more trustees or corporation authorized to act as trustees.
(c) For voting or other lawful purpose.
(d) Grants similar right to any other stockholder to become a party.
Similar statutes in New York and Delaware.
See Tompers v. Bank of Amer., 217 N. Y. S. 67, 217 App. Div.
691.
Tompers v. Bank of Amer., 214 N. Y. S. 643, 126 Misc. Rep.
753.
Chandler v. Bellanca Aircraft Co-........ Del ........
162 Atl. 63,
31 LRA (N. S.) 1199 note.
'Smith v. San Francisco & North Pac. R. R., 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582, 35
LRA 309.
'Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Ins. Co. of Amer., supra, see note No. 3.
'Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, 60 Conn. 553, 24 At!. 32 (1890);
Cone v. Russell, 48 N. J. Eq. 208, 21 At. 847 (1891).
'Boyer v. Nesbitt, 227 Pa. 398, 76 At. 103.
"Windsor v. Commonwealth Coal Co., 63 Wash. 62, 114 Pac. 408, 33 LRA
(N. S.) 63.
1
"Smith v. San Francisco &4North Pac. Ry. Co., supra, see No. 5.
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of the parties thereto. 1 When the agreement only seeks to
secure an office for a party to the agreement as its sole purpose," runs only to the benefit of the parties thereto, 3 perpetuates the parties and their successors in office, or gives a minority the right for an indefinite term to name a majority of the
directors,' 4 it is invalid as a violation of public policy.
In setting up a voting trust agreement, special attention
must be given to insure the creation of an irrevocable trust.
Where the right to direct the trustees is reserved by the stockholders or where by provision in the agreement it is revocable
at any time, 5 or gives the trustees only a bare right to vote,
and no beneficial interest, the trustees are only holders of proxies or trustees of a dry trust.'
An irrevocable trust must be
an active one,' 7 giving some duty and discretionary power to
the trustees, or giving them the voting power, coupled with a
beneficial interest, 8 and in view of this, although search has
discovered no cases on this subject, in Colorado the voting
trust statute, supra, contemplates the creation of an active,
irrevocable trust.
A valid voting trust agreement must be a combination
of stockholders, not merely a pooling of stock in the hands of
trustees for a period, 9 and the stockholders on becoming parties to the agreement, must give assent. 20 It has been held that
the mutual promises of the stockholders in making the agreement is sufficient consideration, 2 ' and that extended credit and
loans to a corporation together with the mutual promises of
'Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, supra, see note No. 7;
Cone v. Russell, supra, see note No. 7;
Boyer v. Nesbitt, supra, see note No. 8.
"Hellier v. Achorn, 255 Mass. 273, 151 N. E. 305, 45 LRA 788.
"Paimbaum v. Magulsky, 217 Mass. 306, 104 N. E. 746.
"Marel v. Hoge, 130 Ga. 625, 61 S. E. 487, 16 LRA (N. S.) 1136.
"Venner v. Chicago City R. R. Co., 258 Ill. 523, 101 N. E. 949.
"Bowditch v. Jackson, 76 N. H. 351, 82 At. 74, LRA 1917A, 1174.
"Brightman v. Bates, 75 Mass. 105, 55 N. E. 809;
Ecker v. Kentucky Refining Co., 144 Ky..264, 138 S. W. 264;
White v. Snell, 35 Utah 434, 100 Pac. 927;
Contra-Harvey v. Linville Jmpr. Co., 118 N. C. 693, 24 S. E. 489, 32 LRA
265;
Contra-Luthy v. Ream, 270 Il1. 170, 101 N. E. 373.
"Boyer v. Nesbitt, supra--see note No. 8.
1In Re Pittock's Will, 102 Ore. 159, 199 Pac. 633, 17 LRA 218, Trust created
by will.
"Lebus v. Stansifer, 154 Ky. 444, 157 S. W. 727.
'Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Ins. Co. of Amer., supra--see note No. 3.
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the parties in making the agreement is likewise sufficient consideration.22
The trustees need not be disinterested. " They are usually
stockholders themselves, and their position as trustees under
an active trust is not inconsistent with their holding office in
the corporation, or with being stockholders. The powers
granted to trustees need not necessarily be restricted to continued control and direction of the corporation or to voting, but
may provide for the dissolution of the corporation,2" for its
merger or reorganization, for the mortgage or sale of the corporate assets, or for any other acts which a stockholder or
stockholders could do as such. 5 The agreement, however,
cannot be such a one as would grant the trustee a power inconsistent with the duty of the stockholders of the corporation,
and no trust agreement is valid which embraces in its provisions anything which would unreasonably prevent a stockholder from entering the agreement at the time of its adoption
or later during its existence." Likewise, a voting trust agreement cannot validly'be created as a means of activity, control
or voting of its own stock by a corporation.2
The validity or invalidity of a voting trust is not subject
to question by a third person. It is necessary that the trustees
be made parties in any question involving the agreement.
Only an equitable interest remains in the stockholder after the
creation of a voting trust, by the issuance of assignable trustees' certificates and this equitable interest is one not subject to
execution.2" The trust cannot be in existence for an unlimited duration of time, 9 although it may be extended after the
expiration of its term,"0 and during the duration of the trust,
the trustees have a lien on the stock to which they have the
legal title for their services in administering the trust."1
"Clark u. Foster, 98 Wash. 241, 167 Pac. 908.
"Thompson Starrett Co. v. E. B. Ellis Granite Co., 86 Vt. 282, 84 Atl. 1017.
2

Bowditch v. Jackson, supra-see note No. 2.
'Butler v.Butler Bros., 186 Minn. 192, 242 N. W. 701.
"Tompers v. Bank of America, supr----see note No. 4;
Hellier v. Achorn, supra---see note No. 12.
"Clark, et at. v. National Steel &, Wire Co., 82 Conn. 178, 72 Atd. 930.
"In Re Seiway Steel, Fence Post Co.'s Receivership, 198 Iowa 950, 200 N. W.
621.
"Canda v. Canda, 112 Atl. 727, 92 N. J. Eq. 423, affirmed 113 Atd. 503.
'Water v. DeMossen, 164 N. Y. S. 82, 176 App. Div. 711.
'Clark, etat. v. National Steel & Wire Co., supra-note No. 27.
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On the question of public policy relative to voting trusts,
the existence of the statute in Colorado cannot be considered
wholly declarative. A statute such as this cannot remove the
legal objections to voting trusts which would tend to create a
monopoly, 2 act in restraint of trade, or to defeat competition,3 3 but an agreement under this permissive statute would
be presumed to be for the benefit of the members, stockholders, and corporation and not for an unlawful purpose 4 in
view of the more recent cases,3 5 rather than be considered void
as against public policy per se.
'State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio 137, 30 N. E. 279.
'Clarke v. Georgia Cent. R. Co., 50 Fed. 338, 15 LRA 683.
"Day v. Hecla Mining Co., 126 Wash. 50, 217 Pac. 1.
'hTbe change to more liberal views is best seen in
Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Ins. Co. of America, supra-see note No. 3.

DID YOU KNOW?
On February 25, 1935, a suit was brought in the District Court by The International Trust Company to foreclose
a mortgage upon the Equitable Building in the city of Denver.
Many of the occupants of this building are doubtless holding
under leases, therefore the Colorado statutes relating to redemptions, by lessees, from foreclosure sales, are of current
interest.
The law of 1929 (p. 538) as amended in 1931 (p.
696) makes provision for redemption by the owner of the
mortgaged property, within the period of six months. Then
there is a provision to the effect that if no such redemption is
made by the owner, an encumbrancer or lienor may redeem.
At page 541 of the laws of 1929 the following appears:
"for the purposes of this Act, a lessee of the premises or portion thereof shall be considered as a lienor."
This provision of the redemption statute is seldom used
and is easily overlooked.
Many of the occupants of the Equitable Building are
lawyers, who may wish to redeem if the property is sold under
the mortgage, and their attention should be called to this stat-

